Introduction
When a Supreme Court judge publicly warns that judges who “fall prey to greed” must be weeded out, the remark resonates far beyond the case in which it is made. It goes to the heart of judicial legitimacy: courts command obedience not because they wield force, but because citizens trust their impartiality and integrity. Where greed and self‑interest infiltrate the bench, that trust erodes, and with it the rule of law.
Judicial Greed and Public Trust
Empirical work from other jurisdictions shows that perceptions of judges’ financial self‑interest sharply reduce diffuse support for apex courts. When judges fail to recuse themselves from cases in which they have a direct personal financial interest, public perceptions of the court’s legitimacy fall significantly, even where the legal reasoning is otherwise sound [1]. The public reads such non‑recusals as bias and as a violation of basic rule‑of‑law norms .
Similarly, surveys show that when people believe many of the judges on a supreme court are very wealthy “millionaire” justices, they are more inclined to think the court gives special rights to the rich and less likely to regard the court as fair or legitimate. Even the mere prospect of appointing another millionaire judge reduces perceived fairness of the institution [2].
These findings underscore why strong statements against judicial greed matter. They signal to the public that the judiciary recognises the corrosive effect of self‑interest and is, at least normatively, committed to cleansing itself.
Structural Forms of Judicial Corruption
Greed on the bench is not limited to bribe‑taking. It can be institutionalised in more subtle ways. Evidence from the Supreme Court of India indicates that judges may be influenced by post‑retirement career incentives: in cases where the government is a litigant, judges facing imminent retirement during the government’s remaining term are more likely to decide in its favour, and such favourable decisions are associated with higher chances of prestigious post‑court appointments [3].
This pattern suggests a structural form of corruption: a tacit exchange of favourable judgments today for lucrative or influential posts tomorrow. Even if individual judges sincerely believe in the legal merits of their decisions, the appearance of such a quid pro quo undermines the court’s moral authority.
Comparative work on judicial ethics in criminal courts in Indonesia similarly notes that, despite clear ethical codes and both internal and external oversight bodies, bribery cases involving judges have increased, tarnishing the justice system and deepening public distrust [4]. The gap here is not the absence of rules, but the weakness of enforcement and accountability.
The Role of Ethical Codes and Oversight
Most judicial systems already have binding codes of conduct that require judges to avoid conflicts of interest, live modestly, and refrain from any form of corruption or impropriety. Yet ethical codes are effective only when:
- Entry standards are high – research stresses the importance of improving the selection mechanism for judges to ensure that only those with professional competence and high integrity are appointed.
- Oversight is real, not symbolic – internal supervision by a supreme court and external oversight by judicial commissions or professional honour boards must be capable of detecting and sanctioning misconduct.
- Sanctions are credible and visible – increasing sanctions for violations of the judicial code of ethics is suggested as a way to restore confidence where judges have been implicated in corruption.
In other words, “weeding out” greedy judges must operate at two levels: keeping compromised individuals off the bench in the first place, and removing or disciplining those whose conduct betrays the ethical core of the office.
Greed, Independence, and the Rule of Law
There is always a tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability. Excessive external control can become a tool for executive intimidation; too little accountability can shelter corruption. The empirical evidence shows that when judges’ personal financial stakes or career ambitions intersect with their adjudicative role, the very independence that the institution is supposed to embody is placed in doubt [5].
Sustained perceptions that the judiciary serves private or governmental interests rather than the law can trigger a broader legitimacy crisis. Once citizens come to believe that “the game is rigged,” compliance with court decisions becomes more fragile, and the judiciary’s ability to resolve social conflict peacefully is weakened .
A firm stance against greed on the bench therefore is not merely an ethical exhortation. It is a functional necessity for preserving the judiciary as a credible guardian of rights and a neutral arbiter between citizen and state.
Reference
[1] Thora Giallouri & Elli Menounou, “Breaking the bank: Personal financial interests of Supreme Court justices and institutional legitimacy,” Social Science Quarterly (2024).
[2] Madhav S. Aney, S. Dam & Giovanni Ko, “Jobs for Justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India,” The Journal of Law and Economics (2017).
[3] Ririn Oktaviani, “Eksistensi Etika Hakim Dalam Persidangan Peradilan Pidana Guna Mewujudkan Lembaga Peradilan Yang Bersih dari KKN,” (2020).
[4] Alex Badas & Billy Justus, “Millionaire Justices and Attitudes Towards the Supreme Court,” Political Behavior (2023).
[5] Josh Chafetz, “Corruption and the Supreme Court,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2024).